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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the health care debate comes to a climax, you will be asked
to vote on a health reform bill within the month which will call for
cost-containment through some form of limits on physicians' fees.
The legislative history of physician fee-capping points both to caps'
successes in bringing down prices (in the case of the recent Medicare
reimbursement overhaul) and their failures in gaInIng popularity in
Congress.

The issue here is whether or not physicians' fees should be

capped or whether a strategy of market reformation should be
introduced.

At present, there are no direct government-imposed

limits on how much physicians can charge for their services;
however, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has
effectively regulated how much they will reimburse doctors for
Medicare services according to their resource costs and to volume
performance standards.

Unfortunately, some Americans do not see

this measure as enough in fighting "the spiralling costs of health
care" and are looking for more demonstrative and direct methods for
cutting the costs of health care in the private sector.

There are two

options presently coming out of committees that will make it to the
floor within the month to try to appease this unsatisfied population:
impose the same government-regulated caps that now apply to
Medicare, or introduce medical savings accounts to induce a
competitive market in health care.

It is my recommendation that the

medical savings account system is the best option available in the
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current political climate, and I hope that you will make the same
conclusion that I have.

PURPOSE

The health care debate began soon after President Clinton took
office in 1993.

He assigned First Lady Hillary Clinton to head a task

force to write the Administration's health care reform bill.

When the

task force unveiled its bill last fall, health care reform became a
major topic of conversation not only in Washington, D. C., but also In
local communities around the country.

For more than ten months, a

battle for health care has been fought in the press, on television, and
in public forums between both sides of the issue, and in the process
approximately fifty million dollars has been spent campaigning-as
much as was spent on the 1992 presidential race.

And like that race,

the health care Issue now comes down to a vote, this time in
Congress.
Before Congress's August recess, the health care bill will be
brought to the floor, and you will be asked to vote on many different
issues and amendments.

One issue that is tantamount is that of

capping physicians' fees as a method of containing health care costs.
This report will recount past methods of Medicare fee schedules and
analyze two methods of fee-capping.

Your decision will affect many

groups of Americans-not just doctors and patients, but also
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Insurance companies, government workers, hospitals-anyone with
ties to the health care industry.

BACKGROUND

The United States government wholeheartedly and irreversibly
became involved in health care when Congress passed Medicare and
Medicaid legislation in 1965 under President Johnson.

The Medicare

legislation was the culmination of several years of public debate and
fairly widespread sentiment towards reform, as is the case today.

It

was through Medicare and Medicaid that physicians' traditional
means of charging patients was first challenged.

Doctors could no

longer charge everyone directly for their services; they now had to
accept government reimbursements for treatment of their elderly or
poor patients.

Needless to say, the American Medical Association

was not too happy with the government's meddling in their affairs
and did not support the legislation.
However, neither Medicare nor Medicaid intended to change
the current practice of medicine-at least not overtly.

While they

both provided financial resources for acute health care, within the
original legislation there was a self-denying clause promising that
"nothing in the Act would affect the practice of medicine" (Brandon
351).

But there was no way for such a large sum of medical funding

not to have some effect on the medical industry, and so the self
denying clause was basically a direct contradiction to the Act's intent.
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It was included to make the bill more politically palatable to the
AMA, President Johnson's most outspoken opponent.
The AMA did accept the Act and its intent not to disrupt
doctors' present practices.

In fact, doctors used the self-denying

clause as an excuse to pump money into new technologies and focus
on hospital-based specialty care, both of which drove up prices.

This

trend continued for nearly five years after the passage of Medicare
and Medicaid, until the federal government took notice of the cost
increases, realized its mistake, and began to impose cost-controlling
measures (Brandon 351).

But the government still reimbursed

physicians for Medicare or Medicaid services primarily on a "usual,
customary and reasonable" (VCR) basis for some twenty years.
In 1972, Congress created an economic index to be part of the
Medicare payment system for physicians.

The new amendment

limited the growth rate of physicians' Medicare charges to the
According to the statistics of the V. S.

growth of general inflation.

General Accounting Office, the limit was successful in controlling the
growth, "result[ing] in a 36-percent increase in prevailing charge
levels from fiscal 1973 through 1978" (Thompson 168).

But while

the growth of Medicare reimbursements slowed to match that of
general inflation, the private costs went up.

Since physicians no

longer received the price they wanted from the government, they
charged the patient's private insurance more to make up for the
balance.

This practice has become commonplace and is known as

"balance billing."

When Medicare changes its reimbursement rates,

doctors change their balance billing to keep their actual charge level.
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Physicians also increased their non-Medicare patients' charges to
compensate for the index's decrease in revenues.

This, too, was

verified by a GAO study done in 1979. (Thompson 168).
Under the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, states were
given permission to try their own reimbursement methodologies as
long as they met certain laws and standards for being reasonable and
economically adequate.
were for Medicaid.

This time, however, the reimbursements

The law required of the states that whatever

cost-containment methods they tried, the payment rates must be
sufficient enough "to ensure that individuals eligible for medical
assistance have reasonable access

to inpatient hospital services of

adequate quality"(Fraser 308, italics added for emphasis).

With this

legislation, the government expressed its order of priorities in health
care:

access and quality above cost.

According also to Section

1902(A)(30) of the Social Security Act, these payments must be
consistent with quality of care.

So while Congress wanted to contain

health care costs, it did not want to sacrifice access and quality to do
so.
During most of the 1980s, however, the issue of catastrophic
coverage took center stage, and not much was done about physicians'
charges.

Then, in late 1989, Congress changed its Medicare Part B

physician reimbursements again.

Continually blamed for

discouraging doctors from choosing primary care or serving In
underserved ares, the UCR method (sometimes referred to as the
"customary, prevailing, and reasonable" or "CPR" method) was no
longer used as the primary standard for reimbursements.
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Instead,

"physicians would be reimbursed on the basis of the relative value of
the resources expended in patient treatment" (Robins 389).

The

intent of the change was to increase rewards for primary care
doctors and for preventive care procedures while decreasing those
for surgeons performing acute care procedures.

Although surgical

societies vehemently opposed this revision, the AMA ultimately
supported it, citing the bill's intent to more equitably distribute
payments among its members (Robins 389).
For the past thirty years, the federal government has had the
luxury of having Medicare and Medicaid as its guinea pigs for health
care policies.

Congress has tried many ways to strap down prices

while trying not to hinder access and quality.

The main lessons that

can be learned from the Medicare and Medicaid experiences are that
keeping costs, access, and quality in proper equilibrium is seemingly
impossible; and that physicians are not going to let legislation that
affects them pass without their having their say in the matter.

The

AMA has been a dominant special interest group since before
Medicare's passage in 1965 and has grown larger in its influence as
health care has taken over more and more of the American economy.
Understandably, the AMA has in one way or another affected every
revision of Medicare since it was passed.
All these changes in reimbursements affected Medicare and its
elderly and disabled beneficiaries, but not the rest of the medical
industry or the majority of Americans.

Outside of Medicare, Congress

has had some bad experiences in the past with price controls, namely
in the 1970s.

President Nixon effectively placed price caps on the
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medical industry and much of the American economy in 1971.

When

the caps were finally removed, the prices for many services
including medical-increased rapidly.

Many saw it as a natural

reaction for the health care industry to try to recover what earnings
they lost due to the price controls.
Then, as part of its National Health Insurance Bill, the Carter
Administration wanted to limit

the amount that hospitals could receIve from private
insurers and government insurance programs.

In 1979,

with the memory of the Nixon controls still fresh,
Congress killed Carter's hospital cost-containment
proposal. (Rubin 2044)

The Congress is wary concernIng the implementation of cost controls.
But the very threat of revenue caps convinced the hospital industry
to implement its own voluntary cost-containment plan, the
"Voluntary Effort" (Litman 406).

Perhaps physicians would respond

the same way.

ISSUE

Should you support a bill that calls for imposing Medicare's
cost-containment methods on private sector medicine or one that
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calls for medical savIngs accounts to be formed to encourage natural
competition among physicians?

PRESENT PRACTICE

Currently, the maIn cost-containment method that applies to
physicians comes under the administration of Medicare.

In order to

curb the increasing charges that the federal government was having
payout to doctors, Congress created the Physician Payment Review
Commission in 1986.

The PPRC's initial charge was "to advise

Congress on reform of the methods used by Medicare to pay
physicians" (Lee et al 2382).

Its task then enlarged in 1988 to

suggest ways to slow down the increases in expenditures for
physicians' services, after those rates rose to 15% a year.

Following a

year's evaluation of research, the Commission announced its
recommendations In April, 1989:

To control growth in expenditures, the Commission
propose[d] the use of expenditure targets, increased
research on effectiveness of medical services, and
development of practice guidelines. (Lee et al 2382)

The PPRC and its recommendations, after Congressional approval, are
the current approaches to squelching doctors' fees for their services
to Medicare beneficiaries.

9

The Commission, headed by two MDs and two PhDs, has
replaced the "customary, prevailing, and reasonable" method with a
fee schedule consisting of three main components:

1. a relative value scale(RVS), which indicates the value
of each service or procedure relative to others;

2. a conversion factor, which translates the RVS into a
fee for each service; and

3. a geographic multiplier, which indicates how payment
for a service is to vary from one geographic area to
another. (Lee et al 2382)

The relative value scale is the most important innovation among
these three, the other two basically being extensions of it.
The RVS was the Commission's proposal to reimburse doctors
for Medicare services based on those services' values in relation to
other services.

The PPRC's RVS contains several key aspects.

For

one, it is resource-based, bringing yet another acronym, RBRVS, or
resource-based relative value scale.

This means that payment is

based on what the doctors themselves had to spend to perform the
services-for instance, the cost of surgical tools, diagnostic machinery,
or laboratory services.

These practice costs are considered to be

"resource-based" and reimbursable by Medicare.
A relative value scale also sets out a list of what a procedure or
service is worth relative to others.

If coronary artery bypass is a

more complex and time-consuming operation than a tonsillectomy,
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its relative value is higher.

That abstract value is translated into real

dollar amounts using the conversion factor, which is updated
annually.
To determine the annual conversion factor updates, the PPRC
uses

a national expenditure target for physicians' serVIces
under Part B....

The target [reflects] the increases In

practice costs, growth in the number of enrollees, and a
decision concerning the appropriate rate of increase in
volume of services per enrollee.

The last factor [reflects]

trade-offs between beneficiary needs, technological
advances, and affordability. (Lee et al 2384)
\

Also within the RVS are codes for surgical global services.

This

part of the strategy "determine[s] which services associated with an
operation should be included in the global payment for surgery and
which ones should be paid separately" (Lee et al 2382).

In

conjunction with a panel of surgeons and insurance representatives,
the relative value of each operation has been tabulated.
The RVS controls costs by eliminating specialty differentials
"differences in payment to physicians of different specialties for the
same procedure code" (Lee et al 2383).

Specialists can no longer

charge more for x-rays than primary care physicians for whimsical
reasons such as enjoying a higher level of prestige.

The PPRC

believes that the best cost-containment method is simply reducing
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the number of unnecessary and inappropriate serVIces while not
giving up access and quality.

There is also a limit on balance billing.

It is important to remember that all of these cost-containment
prOVISIons only apply to Medicare and not to the private sector of
medicine.

PROBLEM

It is common knowledge that physicians earn more money than
the common American, even more than the common middle-class
American.
astonishing.

But data from the AMA on their salary increases is
"Physicians' average net income rose approximately 82%

to $177,400 in 1992 from $97,700 in 1982" (Burda 44).

General

inflation and the growth rate of other salaries for this same period
was approximately half of that.

It is this kind of disproportionate

growth that has caused a general consensus for fee containment to
form.
Although the salary growth rates have slowed quite a bit
recently, there is still a significant gap between middle-class salaries
and those of physicians.

As more and more doctors become

employees of hospitals and managed care programs, their salaries
are becoming more and more public.

The recent onslaught of data on

physicians' salaries has stirred up many people now calling for
something drastic to be done.
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According to the latest studies, radiologists are now averagIng
$309,556 in salary by some estimates.
$159,300 according to the AMA.

General internists are making

And even family practitioners, the

lowest on the physician salary scale, is now averaging $111,800,
again according to the AMA. (Burda 44-45).
Of course, to meet these higher salaries hospitals must pay
more to the doctors, insurance companies must pat more to the
hospitals, and the consumer must pay higher insurance premiums.
U sing this model of cost flow, many reformists cite physician salary
reform as the cornerstone of cost-containment.
While there is cost-containment taking place In Medicare, there
are currently no limits or even targets set on what physicians can
charge the majority of Americans who have private insurance.

OPTIONS

There are two different options available to you at this time.
Each option will have an impact or benefit on the groups of people
affected, a cost of implementation, a level of administrative
feasibility, and an inevitable political reaction by special interest
groups.

A.

Apply the Medicare fee schedule to physicians' private
practices.
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Expenditure targets would be established in each state, and if a state
were in excess of target rates of growth, the Medicare payment
schedule(the relative value scale) would be implemented in that
state.
This option

IS

advocated by House Majority Leader Gephardt

and is part of his Democratic Health Reform Bill.

Under his plan, a

National Health Cost Commission would be formed to oversee the rate
of growth in health care expenditures.

By 2000, the Commission

would recommend whether a system of private-sector cost
containment would go into effect the next year.

The

recommendation would be voted on by the Congress.

If the Congress

decided not to do otherwise, the Medicare payment plan would go
into effect in the private sector of those states not meeting their
expenditure targets.

Doctors are given growth incentives to aim for

their expenditure targets.

IMPACT:

Certainly physicians' pnce rates would come down on

state-wide levels as they tried to avoid government-imposed limits.
Physicians, while not ecstatic, are more amiable towards targets than
they are towards limits.
would not

If their payments were halved, doctors

be able to see twice as many patients to compensate

because of the imposed volume performance standard, which
connects payment with patient volume.

However, physicians, being

the intelligent lot that they are, may find ways to circumvent the
legislation and somehow charge enough to maintain their financial
status.

With this plan there is no market reason for them to lower
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their pnces-no threat of lost patients and no tax incentives-only
mandatory limits to comply with.
Insurance premiums and hospital bill growth would decrease
In the short run if the physicians' fees decreased.
payments to doctors would cause this.

Their drop in

Hospitals would see less use

of their expensive medical machinery as doctors cut down their costs.
Insurance companies would have fewer claims to meet.
If doctor bills declined, it would be easier for people to go
regularly for check-ups and at the onset of minor pains, thus
emphasizing preventive care and preventing greater costs down the
road.

COST: Creating a new National Health Cost Commission (NHCC) and
all of its support staff would create another government bureaucracy
to finance.

As the government converts the private sector into a

Medicare-style system, this Commission has the probability of
growing bigger than the current HCFA.

There would be more

paperwork to do, more financial and service reports to file, and more
bureaucrats to investigate physicians' practices.

ADMINISTRATIVE

FEASIBILITY: The plan is feasible just as

Medicare is feasible, but not without all the new agencies that the
NHCC would have to create.

POLITICAL REACTION: The AMA would be upset for the financial
loss of its members and for the practical nightmare of complying
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with the system.

The AHA and FAH (the hospitals) would be upset

because the volume of services would decrease and they would have
less money to spend on improving their facilities.

The insurance

industry would most likely support the plan as it would increase
their profit margins.

Consumer groups would certainly be pleased if

prices came down, although they would not be happy if the quality
of care deteriorated.

B.

Introduce medical savings accounts to promote market
competition

among

physicians.

Whereas competition keeps prices down within other
industries, the health care industry does not respond to normal
market forces in the normal way.

Senator Gramm, a Texas

Republican, advocates the use of medical savings accounts to drive
down health care costs, including physicians' fees.

The idea is to

make patients more responsible for the payment of their health care
so that they will be more cost-conscious.

Under the current third

party payer system, patients often don't realize how much they are
paying their physician.

If the patient were in charge of paying the

physician, the idea is that they would demand lower prices from
them like they would from any other serVIce, and competitive
doctors would respond by lowering their prices as a real market
environment was established.

The advocates of this system claim

that it "promotes cost-consciousness and benefits those who practice
it" (Gramm 57).
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Employers would save money because instead of buying the
most expensive employee policy to get the biggest tax break, they
would pay into tax exempt medical savings accounts(MSA) for their
employees.

The employees could only use money from their MSAs

for medical purposes.

Whatever money remains in their MSAs at the

end of the year, the employees can keep, thus providing the
incentive for them to shop around for medical care.

IMPACT:

If the economic incentives to providers work as predicted,

the doctors again would not be happy with a salary cut; but they
would rather reduce their rates themselves than have the
government mandate them.

For the consumer, shopping for a

physician would be more like shopping for food, automobiles and
shelter, according to Senator Gramm.
a result of the market competition.

Insurance rates would drop as

Quality of care would stay the

same if not improve as part of that competition.

But there is no

certainty that the health care industry would succumb to market
forces even under these conditions.

Health care is still a different

type of demand than anything else on the economy.

However, the

strength of this plan is that it does address the major obstacles now
in the way of a normal, competitive market for health care.

COST:

The MSA plan would not cost anything more to employers.

Insurance companies would experience a decline in the sales of their
most expensive premiums but would see savings in their physician
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payments.

There is no new government bureaucracy formed here

and no new paperwork.

ADMINISTRATIVE FEASIBILITY:

The only things that needs

implementation in this plan are the medical savings accounts
themselves and their tax-exempt status.

The rest of the plan is self

administered by the physicians and the businesses.

POLITICAL REACTION:

The AMA would support this idea because

it does not pose a threat to physicians' autonomy the way that fee
limits do.

The insurance industry would bless the plan, too, as it

would not affect their profits.

Big and small businesses alike would

be pleased because most of their employees would be getting raises
without the businesses having to spend any more money on them.

RECOMMENDATION

It is my recommendation that you support recommendation B,
the medical savings account.

There is no popular sentiment to limit

car prices, house prices, or food prices because market competition
naturally stifles them.

If there were a way to impose the same

market forces on the health care industry, we would certainly get the
same results.

If private medicine were under the same regulations

as Medicare, it would lead to dangerously high levels of doctor
dissatisfaction.

When doctors take on Medicare patients and their
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frustrating payment process, they have somewhere else to turn:
their private patients.

Option A would lead to the subtle

transformation of all doctors into government employees.

The

relative value scale is a good system for a segment of the population
but not for the entire country.

In my opinion, the MSA plan would

successfully introduce real market forces into the health care
industry and physicians' fees would come down as a natural result of
those forces.

DECISION

BOX
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